By Graham McKay
On 4 September 2024, the government released the final Phase 2 report from the public inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire of 14 June 2017.
The comprehensive document, spanning over 1,700 pages across 14 sections, offers a detailed account of the failures that led to the tragedy. It provides crucial insights into the various parties’ roles along with a series of recommendations for future prevention.
In his introduction, Sir Martin Moore-Bick, the inquiry chairman, emphasised that all 72 deaths in the Grenfell fire were “avoidable.” He highlighted how the residents were “badly failed” by those responsible for the building’s safety. While levels of responsibility varied, Moore-Bick attributed the failings largely to “incompetence” while in other cases, “dishonesty and greed” played a part. He noted that the government and other stakeholders had neglected the dangers posed by certain types of cladding over the decades, with manufacturers engaging in “systematic dishonesty” and misleading customers about product safety.
The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s tenant management organisation was also implicated, having “manipulated” an appointment process to favour an architect inexperienced in high-rise cladding installation. The report further criticised the London Fire Brigade, citing a “chronic lack” of leadership, an overemphasis on procedures, and a prevailing “attitude of complacency.”
The inquiry’s findings underscore the necessity for cultural and behavioural changes, particularly in the construction and safety sectors.
Impact on the TIC sector
Part 3 of the report examines the timeline and processes involved in the testing and marketing of key construction products – specifically the aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores, which were identified in the 2019 Phase 1 report as the primary factor in the rapid spread of flames.
Several critical findings for the TIC sector were highlighted:
- UKAS oversight: The United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) was criticised for being “too lenient” in its assessment of the British Board of Agrément (BBA), failing to adhere to its own policy of witnessing a live test by the Building Research Establishment (BRE) every four years. The report revealed that long-standing flaws in UKAS’s assessments of both BRE and BBA persisted even after the Grenfell fire, proving “stubbornly resistant to correction.”
- Accreditation challenges: The inquiry noted that UKAS relied heavily on accredited organisations to identify and report their own weaknesses, a system based largely on trust. UKAS’s enforcement powers were found to be limited; the most severe action it could take was to suspend or withdraw accreditation. Complicating matters further, accreditation in the certification industry is voluntary, which means that certification bodies can opt out of being accredited if market conditions allow.
- Certification bodies and manufacturer misconduct: Certification bodies such as BBA and LABC were deemed victims of “dishonest behaviour” by unscrupulous manufacturers. However, the inquiry pointed out that these bodies could have prevented much of this had they maintained rigorous processes for investigating manufacturer claims. The BBA, in particular, was criticised for an “inappropriate desire to please its customers,” with a key issue being the conflict between its commercial objectives and its need to ensure the reliability of its certificates. Similar issues were found with BRE’s testing, where the report described how manufacturers like Celotex manipulated the testing process. The lack of formal training on impartiality and independence within BRE was also a significant concern.
Key recommendations for the TIC sector
The report’s recommendations for the TIC sector are both far-reaching and pointed. Perhaps most critically, the inquiry advocated for a more stringent regulatory framework for product testing and certification. It suggests that a new construction regulator should assume responsibility for assessing products’ conformity with legislation, statutory guidance, and industry standards. This shift would make regulator-issued certificates pre-eminent in the marketplace, likely reducing reliance on existing voluntary third-party certifications.
To address the issue of misleading certifications, the report emphasises the need for transparency:
- All test results supporting any certificate issued by the construction regulator should be included in the certificate itself
- Manufacturers must provide the regulator with the complete testing history of their products, disclosing any circumstances that could affect performance
- Manufacturers should be legally required to furnish, on request, copies of all test results supporting any claims about a product’s fire performance
The final report offers a sobering reflection on the Grenfell tragedy, showcasing the need for reform in product testing, certification and accreditation. For the TIC sector, the findings are a call to action to strengthen oversight, prioritise transparency and rebuild trust in the safety and reliability of certified products.